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Human Rights Institutionalisation at the Local Level: A Case Study of Sub-National Human Rights 




Over the past decade, all upper-level (regional) Korean sub-national governments and a large number 
of lower-level (municipal) governments have passed ordinances mandating the establishment of local 
human rights commissions. Many of these commissions have now been set up and operating for several 
years. In this case study, we critically examine the development and work of these commissions, with 
a particular focus on six aspects: personnel; functions; norms; independence; level of activity, and 
relationships with other relevant actors. These areas were chosen for analysis because they correspond 
to institutional aspects that have widely been viewed as important for determining the effectiveness of 
human rights institutions at the national level, and we argue that they are likely to be of similar 
importance at the sub-national level. For each of these areas, we examine the choices made and the 
major challenges faced, and contextualise within the standards established for national human rights 
institutions and experiences in other jurisdictions. The case study is based primarily on examination of 
a mix of primary source documents and secondary Korean-language research on the topic. 
Keywords: Korea; Sub-National Human Rights Institutions; Local Government; Human Rights 




 In recent years, there has been considerable research into the work of national human rights 
institutions (‘NHRIs’), the term used to designate those independent governmental human rights 
commissions, human rights ombudsman offices, and human rights institutes that now exist at the 
national level in well over a hundred nations (Welch, 2017). Compared to the abundant literature on 
NHRIs, relatively few studies have focused on sub-national human rights institutions, which can be 
defined as ‘independent non-judicial governmental institutions that possess a sub-national mandate, and 
whose mission includes the implementation of human rights norms’ (Wolman, 2018). This is perhaps 
a reflection of the general reluctance to study local administrative organs, which are sometimes seen as 
less important than national or international actors. Nevertheless, sub-national human rights institutions 
have proliferated in recent years, and many hundreds of human rights commissions, ombudsmen, 
defensores del pueblo, and similar institutions are now active at different administrative levels all 
around the world (Wolman, 2018). They represent an increasingly important institutional focus for the 
global human rights movement. 
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By presenting a case study of Korea’s experience with sub-national human rights commissions, 
this article intends to contribute to filling this gap. Local human rights implementation in Korea (and 
indeed Asia more broadly) has yet to be the subject of significant English-language research. In 
particular, the study will focus on examining six aspects of sub-national commissions: personnel; 
functions; norms; independence; level of activity, and relationships with other relevant actors. These 
areas were chosen as focal points for this research because they are widely seen as important for the 
evaluation of human rights institutions at the national level. Although there is little research into 
methodologies for sub-national case studies, one would expect (largely) similar issues to arise at both 
the national and sub-national administrative levels. While there are often important differences between 
NHRIs and sub-national human rights institutions – in scale, funding, and relationship with international 
institutions – they share common goals of human rights promotion and protection along with an 
independence from executive bodies.  
For each of the six topical areas, we will first briefly outline the standards and best practices 
laid out by the Paris Principles (1993), the General Observations of the Sub-Committee on 
Accreditation of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (‘GANHRI’) (2018), and 
the Amnesty International Guidelines (2001), in order to justify our attention to particular aspects of 
the work of Korean sub-national human rights commissions.1 We will then discuss the results of our 
study of Korean institutions, with reference to the aforementioned standards and, where relevant, the 
experiences of local human rights actors in other countries.  
The case study is mainly based on primary and secondary documentary research. Primary 
document sources included ordinances establishing local commissions, reports, action plans, and 
commission meeting minutes.2 Documents were examined from a range of jurisdictions at different 
                                                          
1 The Paris Principles are a set of guidelines for NHRIS that was promulgated by the UN General 
Assembly in 1993. They are today considered the most widely accepted means for assessing NHRI 
effectiveness (Mertus 2012: 76-8). GANHRI uses the Paris Principles for accrediting national 
institutions, and has accordingly elaborated upon the Paris Principle standards by issuing General 
Observations. The Amnesty Guidelines provide a separate set of guidelines for NHRI effectiveness 
from the perspective of a major non-governmental human rights organisation. 
2 In particular, we reviewed minutes from the meetings of the human rights commissions of 
Chungcheongbuk-do, Daejeon Metropolitan City, Gijang-gun, Goyang City, Gwangmyeong City, 
Gwangju Metropolitan City, Gwangju Buk-gu, Gyeonggi-do, Seoul Metropolitan City, Seoul Dobong-
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administrative levels and from different regions of Korea, in order to reflect the broad spectrum of local 
human rights institutionalisation in the country. In some cases, these documents were easily accessible 
on local authority websites.3 In addition, the website of the Institute for Human Rights Cities was a very 
useful source for primary documents.4 Amongst a range of other reports and opinions from local human 
rights commissions, its website includes a database of 674 local human rights ordinances from around 
Korea, including separate sections on general human rights ordinances, ordinances on the rights of the 
disabled, ordinances on the rights of women, and ordinances on the rights of children and migrants.  
Secondary sources include academic and policy reports on local human rights governance. 
Although there is little English-language research on Korean local human rights governance, there have 
been a number of Korean-language academic studies on the topic, including those by Young-sun Chung 
(2013), Jongcheol Kim (2014), and Sung-Soo Hong (2015) which provide helpful commentary on local 
commissions. There have also been a few reports and presentations issued by local governments 
themselves (Gang et al 2013; Gwangju City 2018). Perhaps the most thorough recent review has come 
in a report issued by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (‘NHRCK’) (2016). This report 
included survey data from 259 local human rights officers and commissioners, providing a helpful 
snapshot of the state of local commissions at that point in time. These documentary sources were 
supplemented by written responses received pursuant to a list of interview questions on local human 
rights commissions that were e-mailed to an NHRCK policy offer working on the issue of local human 
rights implementation. 
2. Background 
2.1 Human Rights Development in Korea 
                                                          
gu, Seoul Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul Eunpyeong-gu, Seoul Gangbuk-gu, Seoul Jongno-gu, Seoul 
Seodaemun-gu, Seoul Seongbuk-gu, Seoul Yeongdeungpo-gu, Ulsan Metropolitan City, and Ulsan 
Dong-gu. 
3 For example, the websites of Seoul Metropolitan City (www.seoul.go.kr/) and Seongbukgu 
(www.sb.go.kr) had particularly helpful sections dedicated to the work of their human rights 
committees. 
4 See Institute for Human Rights Cities website at http://hrcity.or.kr/. 
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 Over the past two decades, human rights discourse has come to play a peculiarly prominent role 
in the Korean political arena. In the wake of the transition from military rule to democracy in 1987, 
progressive politics has been dominated by a series of former democratisation activists conversant in 
human rights language and concepts. These include Kim Dae Jung (president from 1998-2003), who 
championed human rights in speeches and writings as early as 1983, along with three prominent human 
rights lawyers: Roh Moo Hyun (president from 2003–2008), Moon Jae-In (president from 2017 to 
present) and Park Won-soon (Seoul mayor from 2011 to present). Human rights law and principles are 
often used to frame the historical political conflict with Japan, while also being touted as an important 
tool for addressing North Korean atrocities.  
 During this same period, the institutionalisation of human rights has proceeded within Korean 
government, albeit fitfully, with new initiatives often introduced during periods of progressive control 
only to stagnate or be undermined during conservative rule. The most important of these institutional 
developments has been the 2001 establishment of the NHRCK. The NHRCK has engaged in a full range 
of human rights promotion and education activities, as well as monitoring government laws and policies 
and responding to complaints from members of the public. In 2008, the Anti-Corruption and Civil 
Rights Commission was created to supplement the work of the NHRCK in the arena of public 
administration. A range of other independent commissions have also been established to address past 
human rights abuses, including most notably the Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission (active 
from 2005-2010). As discussed below, local human rights institutions have more recently become 
widespread as well. 
2.2 Local Human Rights Institutionalisation 
In Korea, local governments are divided into high-level regional governments (Gwangyeog 
Jibang Jachi Danche) and lower-level local governments (Gicho Jibang Jachi Danche). With the 
inclusion of Sejong Special Autonomous City in July 2012, the number of regional governments was 
increased to seventeen.5 As of January 2020, there are 226 local governments, including 75 cities (Si), 
                                                          
5 This includes Seoul Metropolitan City, Sejong City, six metropolitan cities (Busan, Incheon, Daegu, 
Gwangju, Daejeon, and Ulsan), and nine provinces (Gyeonggi, Gangwon, Chungnam, Chungbuk, 
Jeonnam, Jeonbuk, Gyeongnam, Gyeongbuk and Jeju Special Self-Governing Province).  
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82 counties (Gun), and 69 districts (Gu). All local administrations are governed by a chief executive 
(governor or mayor) and local council, which is a legislative body representing resident interests (Choi 
et al 2012: 28-9). Article 117 of the Korean Constitution (1948) states that ‘local governments shall 
deal with administrative matters pertaining to the welfare of local residents, manage properties, and 
may enact provisions relating to local autonomy, within the limit of Acts and subordinate statutes’. 
Article 9 of the Local Autonomy Act further specifies the that local governments can undertake to 
promote the welfare of residents, including through, inter alia, operation of social welfare facilities, 
provision of protection and support for the poor, and protection and promotion of the welfare of the 
elderly, children, persons with mental disorders, juveniles, and women. Thus, it is clear that local 
governments have a mandate that in many respects may impact the human rights enjoyed by citizens 
within each jurisdiction, especially with respect to economic and social rights. 
 Although Jinju City passed the first local human rights ordinance in 2007, local government 
interest in human rights institutionalisation began in earnest during the presidential term of Lee Myung 
Bak (2008-2013). As a right-wing leader with strong connections to big business, Lee was widely 
considered to be a negative influence on national-level human rights policies. Local politicians 
understood that human rights progress, if it was to be made, must take place in more progressive sub-
national jurisdictions (Hong 2012). Thus, Gwangju Metropolitan City established a Human Rights Di-
vision in 2010, a Citizens’ Commission on the Promotion of Human Rights in 2012, and a Human 
Rights Ombudsman in 2013. Gwangmyeong City and Ulsan Dong Gu (borough) passed human rights 
ordinances in 2011. Gwangmyeong established a human rights council and Ulsan Dong Gu established 
a human rights commission the following year (Korea Human Rights Foundation 2014). 
The key event in the development of local human rights commissions was the NHRCK’s April 
2012 recommendation that each local government pass a human rights ordinance. Along with this 
recommendation, the NHRCK provided a Model Ordinance (2012), which included in article 10 a 
provision for the establishment of a human rights commission. In the years since their issuance, sub-




At the regional administrative level, all seventeen governments have now passed human rights 
ordinances, each of which mandate the formation of a human rights commission, albeit sometimes going 
by different names (Y Park 2019). However, there have in some cases been delays in actually 
establishing commissions, and Gyeongsannam-do and Gyeongsanbuk-do (two of the most conservative 
provinces of the country) have yet to do so. Incheon only established its human rights commission in 
2019, after many years of protests from conservative Christian groups worried that a human rights 
ordinance could promote homosexuality (Korean Society of Law and Policy on Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity 2016). 
Meanwhile, according to the written responses to interview questions sent to an NHRCK Policy 
Officer (17 October 2019), 95 out of 227 lower level governments had passed human rights ordinances 
as of September 2019. Here also, there was significant regional variation in level of activity – for 
example, all five local jurisdictions in Gwangju and Ulsan (areas with significant histories of human 
rights activity) had passed ordinances by 2016, but none of the local jurisdictions in North Chungcheong 
Province had done so (NHRCK 2016). While these ordinances have normally called for the 
establishment of human rights commissions, it has sometimes taken many years for commissioners to 
actually be appointed (Kim 2014). As of October 2016, the NHRCK (2016) reported that 26 local 
governments had established commissions.  
These commissions share many basic elements in common. They tend to have between ten and 
fifteen commissioners at a time, selected mainly from civil society (NHRCK 2016).6 They are 
exclusively or primarily advisory in nature, and are often focused on the development of a local human 
rights plan. In the following six sections, these commissions will be examined in greater depth, with 
particular attention to personnel; functions; norms; independence; level of activity, and relationships 
with other relevant actors. 
3. Personnel 
                                                          
6 As of 2016, there were a total of 539 commissioners working at 39 regional and municipal 
commissions (NHRCK 2016). 
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Evidently, attracting appropriate personnel is critical to the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
human rights commissions both in Korea and elsewhere. At the national level, the Paris Principles 
(1993) emphasise the importance of pluralism. Pluralism can be defined as inclusion of ‘representation 
of all sections of society, including women, ethnic minorities, and people with disabilities’ (Amnesty 
International 2001: sec. 2.4). The GANHRI General Recommendations (2018: 21) find the ‘pluralistic 
composition of the NHRI to be fundamentally linked to the requirement of independence, credibility, 
effectiveness and accessibility’. The International Council on Human Rights Policy (2005: 8) notes in 
particular that a proper gender balance is ‘vital’. Amnesty International (2001) rightfully adds human 
rights expertise to the shortlist of desired membership qualities. In the view of the International Council 
on Human Right Policy (2005: 15), staff ‘need to possess the necessary professional skills, including 
expertise in human rights’ in order for a NHRI to be effective.  
3.1 Pluralism 
In the Korean context, the earliest ordinances either lacked language related to pluralism 
(Gwangju Metropolitan City 2007; Gyeongsannam-do 2010) or, in the case of Gwangmyeong City 
(2011: art 8(5)), included only an objective to endeavour to include female and disabled commissioners. 
The model ordinance propounded by the NHRCK (2012: art 11(4)) signalled a change in this respect, 
by requiring that at least one third of commissioners be female, a requirement that was echoed in a 
number of later mandates, including those of Goseong-gun (2012: art 11), Mokpo City (2012: art 11); 
and Ulsan Metropolitan City (2015: art 9). The ordinance for Wonju City (2012: art 11) specifies that 
there must be at least four women (out of a maximum of ten members). Hwaseong City (2012: art 11) 
and Seoul Seongbuk-Gu (2012: art 17) opted for gender-neutral requirements, with Hwaseong City 
mandating that no more than 60% of commissioners could be of one gender, and Seongbuk-gu 
specifying that no more than two-thirds of commissioners could be of one gender. The standard that no 
more than 60% of commissioners could be of one gender was later recommended as best practice in a 
report on local commissions by the NHRCK (2017).  
In practice, gender balance does not appear to be a major challenge. According to the NHRCK 
(2017), most regional commissions included over 40% women, with the exception of the Gangwondo 
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commission. Other aspects of diversity (ie race, religion, nationality) have not yet been explicitly 
included as ordinance requirements. 
3.2 Expertise 
It is also important to ensure that Commissioners possess sufficient human rights expertise to 
effectively advise their governments. Attracting personnel with appropriate human rights expertise can 
be a particular challenge at local administrative levels, where there might be few residents with prior 
training or experience in the human rights field. In the Korean context, many commissioners are drawn 
from civil society organisations, and include advocates who have worked on such issues as gender 
rights, disability rights, children rights, migrant and refugee protection, and homelessness. Law 
professors and public interest lawyers are also commonly called upon to serve as commissioners, and 
in some cases have served as commission chairs. Nevertheless, some have argued that there is a lack of 
human rights expertise on local commissions, and additional training programmes for commissioners 
have been strongly advocated (NHRCK 2016). 
4. Functions 
At the national level, it is widely assumed to be desirable for NHRIs to have a broad mandate 
(Linos and Pegram 2017). According to the Paris Principles (1993), ‘a national institution shall be given 
as broad a mandate as possible’.7 While the Paris Principles do not require NHRIs to have a complaint-
handling function, most NHRIs are able to handle complaints from the public, and there is a feeling 
among some commentators that such a function is desirable, if not essential (Carver 2000). 
In general, Korean local human rights commissions have been established as advisory bodies 
(Y Park 2019). Within this broad model, one can see three particular types of mandate. Most commonly, 
the organic laws specifically mandate that commissions deliberate on matters concerning development 
and implementation of a human rights plan, policy promotion according to the human rights plan, and 
other matters deemed necessary by the mayor or chairman (Gwangju Nam-gu 2012: art 10). These are 
the functions proposed by the NHRCK Model Ordinance (2012: art 10), but even those ordinances 
                                                          
7 Amnesty International (2001: sec 3.1) also claims that ‘NHRIs should enjoy the broadest possible 
mandate to address human rights concerns’. 
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passed earlier tend to be limited to deliberative functions (Busan Nam-gu 2011: art 10; Daejeon 
Metropolitan City 2012: art 7). It should be noted however, that even with this relatively narrow 
mandate, some commissions have engaged in relatively wide-ranging discussions and provided varied 
types of advice. For example, in one recent meeting the Gyeonggi-do Human Rights Commission 
(2018) also discussed and advised upon human rights education practices, resolution of human rights 
complaints, challenges facing the Gyeonggi-do Human Rights Centre, and the Gyeonggi-do Human 
Rights Banquet. 
Secondly, in some commissions, there are two additional functions that are included in 
mandates, namely providing advice on the human rights implementations of local laws and policies 
(Seoul Metropolitan City 2012: art 14) and managing a human rights centre (or providing advice or 
recommendations with respect to the centre) (Jeollabuk-do 2015: art 9; Seoul Seongbuk-gu 2012: art 
16). 
Finally, there are a few commissions that possess significantly broader mandates, perhaps in 
some cases because they predate the standardising effect of the NHRCK recommendations. Thus, in 
addition to its advisory function, the Gwangmyeong City Civil Rights Commission is also mandated to 
investigate matters raised by citizens, provide recommendations for investigations, research, ordinance, 
institutions, policies and practices concerning human rights, and engage in human rights education and 
promotion (Gwangmyeong City 2011: art 9). The Seongbukgu Commission can provide 
recommendations on citizen human rights complaints and engage in promotion activities (Seoul 
Seongbuk-gu 2012: art 16). The Busan Metropolitan City Human Rights Commission and the 
Jeollabukdo Commission are mandated to engage in human rights protection, promotion and education 
(Busan Metropolitan City 2015 art 5; Jeollabuk-do 2015: art 9). While the Seoul Human Rights 
Commission has a mandate focused on advice and deliberation, it has interpreted that to include public-
facing activities such as the organisation of seminars and forums (NHRCK 2016). A few commissions 
also operate sub-commissions to monitor the local human rights action plan or engage in human rights 
impact assessment (Interview with NHRCK Policy Officer, 17 October 2019).  
 Clearly this scope of work is limited in comparison to that of national institutions. It is debatable 
whether that should necessarily be considered a failing, however. For one thing, there are certain areas 
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where the scope of work of national human rights institutions would naturally be greater than that of 
local ones. For example, the Paris Principles (1993) require NHRIs to address violations in ‘any part of 
the country’, which would clearly be inappropriate for a local commission. The Paris Principles also 
urge NHRIs to encourage state ratification of UN human rights instruments, and encourage NHRI 
contribution to national reports to UN bodies, which would presumably be less frequently prioritised 
by institutions that have merely local mandates.8 
Second, in some jurisdictions there are multiple human rights bodies, some of which engage in 
other activities. In Seoul and Gwangju, for example, there are human rights ombudsperson offices that 
are mandated to address complaints from the public and exist alongside commissions (Korea Human 
Rights Foundation 2014).9 In several other locations, including Gwangmyeong, Gyeonggi-do, Seoul 
City, and many boroughs of Seoul, there are human rights centres or human rights teams within local 
administrations that engage in activities such as developing human rights policies, engaging in human 
rights promotion and sometimes issuing recommendations on public complaints (Korea Human Rights 
Foundation 2014). Seongbuk-Gu in Seoul has even established a human rights library to assist in public 
human rights education.10 
Third, unlike the United States, Italy, Japan and some other countries, Korea already has a 
strong national human rights commission with the capacity to hear complaints regarding infringements 
of human rights by local governments (as well as the national government). Given the generally 
centralised nature of Korean administration, there is perhaps less need for separate local commissions 
to resolve complaints than might exist elsewhere. 
                                                          
8 It should be noted, however, that some local human rights institutions in other countries have engaged 
in each of these tasks (Wolman 2015).  
9 In these cases, some coordination may be necessary to avoid conflicts or duplication of tasks. In Seoul, 
the human rights ombudspersons are able to attend Human Rights Commission meetings and provide 
recommendations therein (Seoul Metropolitan City 2012: art 20(5)). The Commission may also play a 
supportive role for other human rights bodies. In Seoul, for example, the City Human Rights 
Commission helped promote the institutional independence of the Ombudsperson Office during its early 
years (Moon 2015).  
10 Seongbukgu is a borough in the northwest of Seoul which is the site of several universities and the 
home of many foreign diplomats and expats; it has been considered the most active lower-level 




Finally, local commission in Korea are quite recently established and thus it is perhaps natural 
that they are mandated to undertake a relatively limited range of activities. There is a hope among at 
least some activists that with time some commissions will be given more powers, such as the power to 
respond to complaints from the general public (Y Park 2019). 
5. Norms 
At the national level, commentators have paid significant attention to both the breadth of norms 
covered by NHRIs and the source of those norms, each of which will be discussed in turn with respect 
to Korean local commissions.  
5.1 Breadth of Mandate 
At the national level, the Paris Principles (1993) suggest that institutions be given ‘as broad a 
mandate as possible’, while, the Amnesty International Guidelines (2001: art 3.1) urge that NHRIs 
possess the power to protect and promote economic and social and cultural rights, as well as civil and 
political rights. In practice, however institutions vary considerably in breadth, with many NHRIs 
concentrating on anti-discrimination norms. The same range can be seen globally at the sub-national 
level, with some local commissions possessing comprehensive normative mandates while others focus 
on a single issue or type of right (Wolman 2018). 
In Korea, local human rights commissions established according to the 2012 NHRCK model 
have been given non-specific mandates to address any type of human rights issue. In practice, this can 
lead to commissions discussing quite a range of substantive issues, oftentimes with a focus on the effect 
of government action on vulnerable groups, such as the disabled, elderly, women and young people. 
Ensuring that local offices and services are accessible to the disabled has been a particular focus for, 
commission in, inter alia, Daejeon (2019), Gwangju Dong-gu (2019), and Gwangmyeong (2019). Of 
course, many of the municipal commissions engage with quite small-scale issues from a rights 
perspective. For example, the Gwangmyeong Human Rights Commission (2019) issued 
recommendations on pedestrian rights at a local intersection and the Daejeon Human Rights 
Commission (2019) issued recommendations on the improvement of handicapped access to a local 
university’s concert hall. Larger jurisdictions have targeted broader issues of equality as well. For 
example, the Seoul Human Rights Commission has issued recommendations calling for improved 
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support for single parents (Seoul 2017), the adoption of a human rights management approach by 
municipal entertainment and investment bodies (Seoul 2018), and non-discrimination against sexual 
minorities in the use of Seoul Plaza (Seoul 2019). 
As has occurred in a number of countries, in many Korean localities there has also been a 
proliferation of issue-specific rights ordinances in recent years. The most common issues addressed 
herein are gender discrimination, disability rights and children or students’ rights. Many of these 
provide for the establishment of issue-specific commissions. Thus, for example, the Haenam-gun Gender 
Equality Basic Ordinance (2016: sec 3) mandated the establishment of a Haenam-gun Gender Equality 
Commission, to provide advice on gender issues, including the gender equality policy implementation plan, while 
the Gwangju Metropolitan City Ordinance on Disability Discrimination and Human Rights Protection  (2017a: 
art 14) mandated the establishment of the Gwangju Metropolitan City Disability Discrimination and Human 
Rights Protection Commission to advise on issues of disability rights. Evidently, where there are multiple 
active commissions, this brings up issues of potential redundancy, and potential conflict if, for example, 
a gender equality commission issues recommendations that are inconsistent with those of a human rights 
commission.  
Although Korean commissions have often focused on human rights issues for which there is 
already a broad societal consensus (ie rights of the elderly, disabled, or children), a robust opposition 
to commissions has nevertheless emerged from right-wing conservatives focused mainly on a fear of 
legitimisation of LGBT rights and, to a lesser extent, Islamophobia (Republic of Korea NGO 
Alternative Report 2018). In 2018, the high point of this opposition came with a successful campaign 
by conservative Christian groups to repeal the Chungcheonnam-do human rights ordinance (Korean 
Society of Law and Policy on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 2016). Later that year, however 
there was a change in political control of the Chungcheonnam-do Council due to local elections, with 
the more left-wing Democratic Party replacing the conservative Liberty Korea Party, and the new 
majority re-passed the ordinance. The opposition did leave an impact, though, as the new ordinance 
lacked a provision contained in the original ordinance banning discrimination based on sexual or gender 
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identity.11 It also inspired further campaigns elsewhere in the country, with varying levels of success. 
Local councils in Haeundae-gu and Suyeong-gu ended up deleting reference to discrimination based on 
sexual orientation from their ordinances (Korean Society of Law and Policy on Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity 2016) while Jeungpyeong-gun abolished its human rights ordinance (Paek 2018). 
5.2 Source of Norms 
Human rights norms can be expressed in global or regional treaties and declarations, in national 
constitutions and statutes, and in local level ordinances. At the national level, the Paris Principles (1993) 
do not discuss which sources of norms that should be used be used by NHRIs, but do clearly set forth 
that institutions should ensure harmonisation of national legislation, regulations and practices with 
international instruments to which the country is a party. The Amnesty International Guidelines (2001) 
urge implementation of both international and domestic norms, and also emphasises the importance of 
NHRI implementation of international human rights norms from UN and regional treaties.  
At the local level, the NHRCK Model Ordinance (2012: art 2) defines human rights broadly to 
include treaty norms, customary international law, national constitutional norms, and leaves open the 
possibility of creating local norms. So far, however, there seems to be little explicit usage of 
international law. This is perhaps reflective of Korea’s broader legal culture. While Korea’s 
Constitution is clearly monist,12 in practice human rights treaties are relatively infrequently cited even 
at the Constitutional Court, which is the court where one might expect to see the greatest engagement 
with international law (Won 2018: 607). Regional norms evidently would play little role in Korea, 
unlike most other parts of the world, due to the absence of an East Asian regional human rights system. 
Interestingly, there does appear to be a significant number of local norms that have been 
elaborated at the local level. These include the Gwangju Human Rights Charter, the Ordinance on 
Preventing Employment Discrimination against the Elders˼ (Ulsan), the Ordinance on Preventing 
Discrimination against the Disabled˼ (Busan, Incheon, Gangwon Province, Sejong City, etc.) and the 
                                                          
11 Despite these changes, protest continues in the region, as shown by the violent disruption of a recent 
meeting (S J Lee 2019).  
12 Art 6.1 of the Korean Constitution (1948) states that ‘[t]reaties duly concluded and promulgated under 
the Constitution and generally recognized rules of international law shall have the same force and effect 
of law as domestic laws of the Republic of Korea.” 
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Ordinance on the Protection of Rights of Emotional Workers in Seoul (NHRCK 2017). It is difficult to 
gauge the extent to which these local sources are actually being used by local commissions, and the 
degree to which they would be interpreted differently to international norms. 
6. Independence 
As is the case at the national level, it is important that sub-national commissions retain their 
independence from political actors who might want to influence their work. As the Amnesty 
International Guidelines (2001: sec 1) make clear, formal independence is not enough to ensure that an 
institution remains free of government control. Some of the factors that can affect an institution’s 
independence include whether government officials are permitted to serve on commissions, the method 
of appointment for commissioners, the ease of dismissal of commission members, and the security of 
commission funding. According to the GANHRI General Recommendations (2018: 24). ‘government 
representatives and members of parliament should not be members of, nor participate in, the decision-
making of organs of an NHRI’. In addition, security of tenure is essential to the independence of an 
NHRI (GANHRI 2018: 33). 
In Korea, local human rights commissions vary in the extent to which they allow government 
officials to serve. Many commissions include only private citizens (Hong 2015). However, some 
include a mix of private citizens and one or two public officers serving ex officio, normally including 
governmental human rights officers and/or the head of local government (Hong 2015; NHRCK 2016). 
For example, in Gwangju Metropolitan City (2007: art. 15), the deputy mayor acts as ex officio 
chairperson of the City’s human rights commission . The presence of government officials in 
commission meetings may be helpful to ensuring that the commissions actually influence those with 
the power to make and implement policy. However, there is also a risk that the government officials 
will dominate meetings and the commission will act with less independence.  
Politicians can also affect the independence of human rights commissioners through threats to 
cut institutional funding, dismiss commissioners or even decommission the institution itself.  The use 
of funding cuts to curb institutional independence was illustrated perhaps most notably in Korea itself, 
where conservative president Lee Myung Bak slashed the NHRCK budget (after initially threatening to 
shut it down) as a means of showing his disdain for the institution (S Park 2009). At the local level, 
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dismissal of commissioners is likely to be rare due to the relatively short terms of office for 
commissioners (terms of two years are most common).13 According to the commissions’ ordinances, 
dismissal is normally anticipated in cases of inability or unwillingness to perform duties, publication of 
secrets, or for reasons of lack of dignity. Threats of funding cuts would no doubt be more commonly 
used as a cudgel, but in some case such threats may be hollow due to the minimal budgets currently 
allotted to commissions.  
There are conflicting views as to whether, in practice, lack of independence is currently an issue 
or not for local commissioners. In an interview response, an NHRCK policy officer (17 October 2019), 
claimed that there have not been any real problems with lack of independence to date, although they 
could theoretically arise. However, observers have criticised some local commissions for lacking 
independence (Hong 2012). Perhaps the most serious threat to institutional independence has come 
from attempts (a few of which were successful, as discussed below), to repeal or revise human rights 
ordinances, primarily due to objections that they provided protection against discrimination based on 
sexual orientation or sexual identity. Certainly, this possibility could influence the likelihood of 
commissioners providing strong support for anti-discrimination policies in those areas 
7. Activity 
If a human rights commission is to provide more than just window dressing, then it must be 
actively carrying out its responsibilities. The Paris Principles (1993) specify that national institutions 
should meet on a regular basis and should receive adequate funding, so as to allow them to have their 
own staffs. The GANHRI General Recommendations (2018: 27) accordingly consider adequate funding 
to be an essential requirement for NHRIs. The Amnesty International Guidelines (2001: sec 2.5-2.6) 
further state that adequate resources are necessary for human rights institutions to complete their work 
and maintain their independence. Evidently, it is also important that local human rights commissions 
meet and are sufficiently funded, and carry out the tasks contained in their mandates. With local 
                                                          
13 Commission members serve for three years in Seoul, Gyeonggi-do, and Chungcheongnam-do, but 
elsewhere two years is standard (NHRCK 2012).  
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commissions having far lower visibility than national institutions, there may be more of a danger of 
human rights institutions falling into disuse or irrelevance. 
In practice, it has often been a challenge to ensure that local commissions in Korea actually do 
more than just exist on paper. In many cases, commissions have taken a very long time to be established 
even after local governments were mandated to do so by the passage of a human rights ordinance 
(NHRCK 2017; Kim 2014). In a few cases, such as in Gyeongsannam-do and Gyeongsanbuk-do, 
commissions still do not exist, despite the passage of human rights ordinances mandating the 
establishment of commissions in 2010 and 2013, respectively (NHRCK 2017).  
Even when they have been fully established, the level of activity appears to vary quite widely. 
The NHRCK Model Ordinance (2012: art 13) prescribes that meetings should be held quarterly or upon 
the request of the mayor or chairman. A number of commissions follow this rule of quarterly meetings 
(Seoul Metropolitan City 2012: art 16; Jeollabukdo  2015: art 14). However, there is no uniformity 
among commissions on this issue. The Seongbukgu Human Rights Commission must meet at least 
every month (Seoul Seongbuk-gu 2012: art 20). A number of ordinances require regular meetings be 
held twice a year (Goseong-gun 2012: art 12; Gwangju Nam-gu 2012: art 20). Others require that 
meetings be held once a year (Goheung-gun 2012: art 12; Mokpo City 2012: art 12). Some ordinances 
do not lay out a schedule for meetings, but simply state that meetings may be convened upon the 
chairman’s request or the request of some proportion of the commission or a political leader (Busan 
Nam-gu 2011: art 14; Daegu Dalseo-gu 2012: art 13). 
While a minimum number of meetings is usually prescribed by ordinance, in some localities it 
is clear that commissions have been less active than their mandate requires (NHRCK 2017). On the 
other hand, others exceed their minimum, for example the Seoul human rights commission has been 
holding meetings six to eight times a year, despite a quarterly requirement (NHRCK 2017). Gwangju, 
Gwangmyeong and Suwon, also have quite active human rights commissions. Thus, there appears to 
be a considerable divide between localities with active human rights commissions and others where 
commissions rarely meet. This has led to a certain amount of scepticism regarding commission 
effectiveness in those localities where meetings are infrequent (Choi 2018). In some cases, observers 
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have noted that the commissions are not functioning properly or have little influence on policy matters 
(NHRCK 2017; Hong 2015).  
Even among those commissions that do meet frequently, however, a lack of adequate funding 
and manpower appears to be a limiting factor on commission activity. For example, local governments 
do not always provide enough funding for commissioners to take part in relevant meetings (Interview 
with NHRCK Policy Officer, 17 October 2019). In many cases, funding has not been provided for 
promotional or implementation activities (NHRCK 2017).  
In recent years, a number of commissions have begun to hire permanent workers or create 
secretariats in order to help engage in programmatic initiatives (Hong 2012). Among other benefits, this 
would allow local commissions to draft human rights action plans in-house – while the Enpyoung-gu 
commission in Seoul has drafted its own plan, this is the exception; mainly such plans are written by 
outside parties, often academics, on the commission’s behalf (Eunpyeong-gu 2016). This move towards 
building greater capacity has been encouraged by the NHRCK, which has recommended that more 
people be hired by local commissions to engage in implementation activities (NHRCK 2017; Han 
2019). 
8.  Relationships with Other Relevant Actors 
The Paris Principles (1993) state that NHRIs should ‘maintain consultation with the other 
bodies, whether jurisdictional or otherwise, responsible for the promotion and protection of human 
rights’ and ‘develop relations with the non-governmental organizations devoted to promoting and 
protecting human rights’. The GANHRI General Recommendations (2018: 15) further recommend 
NHRIs to ‘develop, formalize and maintain regular, constructive and systematic working relationships 
with other domestic [human rights] institutions and actors’ and engage in knowledge-sharing  and 
training activities with them. The importance of effective networking is reinforced by the Amnesty 
International Guidelines (2001: sec 1.4), which state that an NHRI ‘should be directed to establish 
effective cooperation with other human rights institutions, whether domestic or from other countries, 
non-governmental organizations, including human rights organizations, and UN human rights bodies’. 
The importance of productive interactions with other actors can be analysed in three parts, as relates to 
the NHRCK, other local human rights institutions, and to non-governmental actors. 
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8.1 National Human Rights Commission of Korea 
To date, the NHRCK has been the most important external body for the development of local 
institutions. The NHRCK has consistently exerted pressure on local governments to create human rights 
commissions. In particular, its Model Ordinance (2012) spurred on the growth of local commissions 
beyond those few jurisdictions with a pre-existing connection to the human rights movement. In 2016-
17, it issued a follow-up report and recommendation, urging the further development of human rights 
commissions at the local level (NHRCK 2017). The NHRCK is not unique in its interest in establishing 
local commissions; in Russia and India, also, the NHRIs have successfully pressed for the establishment 
of local institutions (Wolman 2013).  
Once the local commissions have been established, the NHRCK has been involved in providing 
capacity building and networking services, for example by holding a talk once or twice a year with the 
chairpersons of the commission of metropolitan cities in Korea and hosting a Human Rights Advocates 
Conference for local government officials to discuss ways to strengthen local human rights institutions 
and their roles. The NHRCK has formalized a capacity-building relationship with several provincial 
commissions through the signing of Memorandum of Understandings (NHRCK 2017). It is currently 
planning to expand its provision of training programmes to give access to commission members from 
lower-level local authorities. This capacity building role has also been adopted by NHRIs in Mexico, 
India, Australia with respect to their sub-national counterparts (Wolman 2013). The NHRCK has also 
played a supporting role by announcing its opposition to the abolition of the Chungcheonnamdo human 
rights commission and organising an emergency forum participated in by human rights activists and 
academic circles to discuss supporting local human rights institutions (NHRCK 2019).  
On the other hand, there could in theory be potential for tensions or conflicting opinions on 
human rights issues between local and national commissions (Y Park 2019). In practice, such conflicts 
are probably unlikely at the moment because so few local commissions are involved in complaint 
resolution, which is the area where conflicts have tended to arise between local and national bodies in 
other countries (Wolman 2013). 
8.2 Other Local Human Rights Institutions 
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Networking with peers can help local human rights institutions ensure conformity with best 
practices (Byrnes et al 2008), facilitate exchange of information and coordination (Renshaw 2011), and 
assist in the development of new institutions (Renshaw and Fitzpatrick 2012). As mentioned, the 
NHRCK has played a significant role in facilitating networking between peer local institutions. In 
addition, important networking opportunities have been provided by the Gwangju government. Each 
year since 2011, Gwangju has hosted a World Human Rights City forum, which provide an opportunity 
for networking for local commissioners with their peers from around Korea and the world. The Human 
Rights City Research Institute, which is a think-tank promoting human rights governance at the local 
level, has also playeda valuable role in disseminating news and policies from different localities and 
encouraging best practices. Finally, it is worth noting that informal networking platforms such as Kakao 
Talk groups have also been established to exchange information among local and national 
commissioners (Gyeonggi-do Human Rights Commission 2018). 
8.3 Civil Society Actors 
There is widespread agreement among both practitioners and academics that civil society actors 
are vital for ensuring that human rights commission (Y Park 2019). Citizen participation will increase 
the likelihood of residents' awareness, criticism and involvement in human rights issues (Han 2019). A 
few jurisdictions have initiated more formal programmes to allow human rights commissions to interact 
with the public on human rights matters, including the "Human Rights Policy Round" in Gwangju and 
the "Human Rights Declaration and the Roundtable Conference of Provincial Citizens' Participation 
Groups" in Chungcheongnam-do (NHRCK 2017). However, local commissions still retain a low profile 
in most cases, many consider to be the biggest challenge for local commission (NHRCK 2016). This 
can lead to difficulties obtaining informed and representative community views to inform their advisory 
work as well as complicating policy promotion.  
9. Conclusion 
Over the course of roughly a decade, human rights law and policy has gone from being a non-
issue for Korean local governments to being the subject of considerable institutionalisation, with over 
a hundred ordinances and dozens of human rights commissions. As this study has shown, these 
commissions have faced a number of challenges. Some have had difficulty recruiting independent and 
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diverse human rights experts to serve as commissioners. In other commissions, meetings have been 
infrequent and a lack of secretariats or sufficient budget has hampered commission’s activity. Civil 
society actors have not always been sufficiently aware of the local commissions’ existence, or of the 
services that they can provide.  
 However, several of the commissions have also shown that they can be active and contribute 
to the local policy discourse. While most commissions are firmly advisory in nature, some of the more 
ambitious bodies are engaging in training programs and human rights promotion, and, in a few cases,  
responding to complaints from the public. There is abundant networking between different 
commissions, and the NHRCK has played a prominent role in encouraging good practices. At least in 
a handful of larger or more ‘human rights-friendly’ jurisdictions, commissions are gradually becoming 
more well-established and active. 
This mixed record is perhaps to be expected. In other countries, as well, local-level human 
rights institutions have shown a quite wide range of functionality and quality. Without an authoritative 
accreditation mechanism, as exists for NHRIs, it is difficult to ensure that local human rights institutions 
work as planned. In a number of countries, NHRIs and sub-national institutions have together 
established domestic associations of human rights institutions, in part as a way to promote best practices 
among members.14 In principal, a similar association in Korea could require that local institutions attain 
a certain level of effectiveness in order to be given full membership, as a way to motivate the relevant 
local jurisdiction to sufficiently support sub-national human rights bodies. While the NHRCK would 
likely be integral in setting up such a body, over time such a network could act on its own to accredit 
new members, as well as engage in other tasks such as helping local jurisdictions set up new 
commissions and promoting best practices. 
As is the case in other local jurisdictions around the world, the effectiveness of Korean local 
commissions could also be improved through access to greater funding, and more training for 
commissioners who may not have strong experience with human rights law prior to taking their position. 
                                                          
14 Examples of domestic associations include the Australian Council of Human Rights Agencies, 
Canadian Association of Statutory Human Rights Agencies, Federación Nacional de Personeros de 
Colombia, and Asociación Defensores del Pueblo de la República Argentina.  
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Currently, the NHRCK has plans to provide additional human rights training for local commission 
members (Interview with NHRCK Policy Officer, 17 October 2019); this is a helpful initiative that also 
highlights the importance of cultivating strong relationships between local and national actors. Strong 
NHRCK links with sub-national institutions would also be helpful in ensuring that conflicts or tension 
between local and national policies are handled appropriately, and potentially wasteful redundancy is 
kept at a minimum.  
More fundamentally, some have suggested incorporating secretariats into local commissions or 
appointing one permanent commission member (Han 2019). These reforms would be useful ways of 
encouraging competency and effectiveness, but secretariats would involve financial outlays that might 
prove prohibitive, at least in smaller jurisdictions, while permanent commission members might prove 
overly dominant in practice. In this respect, accelerated movement away from a one-size-fits-all model 
based on the NHRCK Model Ordinance would allow larger or more ambitious jurisdictions to develop 
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